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Abstrat The inome tax system is the main instrument of sal poliy
that aims to improve inome distribution and eonomi growth, but the
problem arises when there is orrupt behavior in that system. While the tax
audit is a tax ontrol tool that is ostly, the tax system should guarantee,
however, the instruments for tax olletion. In this researh work, we formu-
late a model in whih all taxpayers deide to pay taxes or not aording to
their personal inome, individual preferenes with respet to the audit and
tax ontrol information pereived in their soial environment. We develop a
theoretial model to study the struture of itizen networks that must pay
taxes. First, we assume that itizens are lassied by two soial groups, the
rih and the poor. When all itizens are taxpayers, but publi authorities
are orrupt, we show that the poor group is the most aeted by orruption.
However, when taxpayers are orrupt or tax evaders, we implement meh-
anisms to audit and ontrol this orrupt behavior. Hene, we show that
this situation of orruption and ontrol of tax payments an be represented
by several well-known theoretial games. Then, we apply the evolutionary
theory of the game in the network onsidering that eah taxpayer reeives
information from his\her neighbors about the probability of audit and that
he\she ould reat aording to his\her risk status and real inome. Suh
behavior forms a group of informed agents that propagate the information
beyond the proportions of the informed and uninformed ontributors that
are modied. Our evolutionary model in the struture of the network de-
sribes the hanges in the population of taxpayers driven by the impat of
information on the future sal audit. Our simulation analysis shows that the
initial and nal preferenes of taxpayers depend on important parameters,
that is, taxes and nes, audit information and osts.
Keywords: behavioral eonomis; orrupt behavior; inome distribution;
inome taxation system; network Games; population games.
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1. Introdution
The misuse of publi oe for private gain in a manner that ontravenes the
rules of the game (so it is dened orruption) has been found responsible for losses
in GDP growth (Abed and Davoodi, 2000; Leite and Weideman, 1999; Mauro,1996;
Tanzi and Davoodi, 2000), in the ratio of investments to GDP (Ades and Di Tella,
1997; Mauro,1996; Tanzi and Davoodi,1998), in the ratio of publi eduation and
publi health spending to GDP (Mauro, 1998), in the ratio of tax revenues to GDP
(Ghura, 1998), in some measures of government revenues to GDP ratio (Tanzi and
Davoodi, 2000), and nally in the amount of foreign diret investment (Habib and
Zurawiki, 2001).
Corruption may also aet inome inequality by means of other variables like
quality and quantity of publi servies (espeially in the eduation and health se-
tors), by reduing the eetiveness of publi spending. Inequality of opportunities
like having a healthy body and equal aess to a deent eduation may have ree-
tions on future inome perspetives, and therefore on inome inequality. Hene, or-
ruption is likely to aet the investment in and formation of human apital through
its impat on the eetiveness, outomes, and omposition of publi spending, whih
in turn may undermine long term sustainable development, eonomi growth and
equality.
Both theoretially and empirially, it has been shown how orrupt praties
on the part of publi oials an ompromise growth and exaerbate inequalities
by distorting inentives, destroying opportunities, squandering resoures, and per-
verting publi poliy. For example, some researh papers studying the relationship
between orruption and inome inequality are, among others, the following:
1. (Andres and Ramlogan-Dobson, 2011) shows that lower orruption is assoiated
with higher inequality in Latin Amerian ountries. This result is in ontrast
with previous studies but the panel of LA ountries makes suh results robust
for several reasons, institutional and ultural aspets.
2. (Apergis at al., 2010) investigate the ausality between orruption and inome
inequality within a multivariate framework for the U.S. over the period 1980
to 2004. Using ointegration tehniques, they detet a long-run relationship
between orruption and inome inequality and a bidiretional Granger-ausality
between these two variables.
3. (Chong and Gradstein, 2007) investigates theoretially and empirially the re-
lationship between inequality and institutional quality, plaing its ndings (of
a double ausality between these two variables) in the ontext of the oniting
evidene as to how orruption aets inequality.
4. (Diner and Gunalp, 2005) use a panel dataset for the US states and nd robust
evidene that an inrease in orruption (measured by the number of onvitions
for rimes related to orruption) inreases the Gini oeient of inome in-
equality and dereases inome growth. They justify this fat by saying that
the benets of orruption are likely to ow to better-onneted individuals and
groups who typially belong to higher inome groups. Better onneted individ-
uals are more likely to get the most protable government projets, undermining
the government's ability to ensure equitable distribution of resoures.
5. In Indonesia, (Olken, 2005) studies the extent of orruption in a large transfer
program distributing subsidized rie to poor households. Using survey data, he
nds that losses due to orruption may be large enough to outweigh the redis-
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tributive potential of this soial welfare program beause about 18% of the rie
disappeared between the time it left government warehouses and the time it
reahed poor households, and omparing the osts of this orruption with the
potential redistributive benets from the program, orruption was suiently
large to outweigh the intended benets of the program. This suggests that or-
ruption an seriously hamper the redistributive eorts of soial programs, so
inome inequality.
6. (De Gregorio and Lee, 2002) and (Li et al., 1998) nd that average years of
shooling, and other eduational fators, ontribute positively to a more equal
distribution of inome. (Li et al., 1998) and (Barro, 2000) are examples of oth-
ers who also nd that more shooling appears to have an inome equalizing
eet.
7. (Gupta et al., 2002) shows that high and rising orruption inreases inome
inequality and poverty. They onlude that poliies that redue orruption will
most likely redue inome inequality and poverty as well.
8. (Gupta et al., 2000), based on a ross-ountry analysis, nd that orruption
inreases inome inequality through lower eonomi growth, biased tax systems
favoring the wealthy and well onneted, lower levels, and eetiveness of soial
spending, and unequal aess to eduation and publi servies.
9. Using panel data from Afrian ountries, (Gymah-Brempong, 2001) laims that
a one-point inrease in the orruption index is assoiated with a seven-point
inrease in the Gini oeient of inome inequality. Despite the availability of
a panel dataset, however, this author does not address the issue of ausality.
This paper seeks to make a further ontribution to the researh analysis of or-
ruption, inome distribution, and tax ontrol, by applying game theory, and network
analysis as a powerful tool to study the behavioral dynamis of orruption in a tax
system. The tax system is one of the most important mehanisms of state regulation.
A signiant part of this system is tax ontrol, whih provides reeiving taxes and
fees in the state budget. A wide lass of models, suh as (Chander and Wilde, 1998;
Vasin and Morozov, 2005; and Boure and Kumaheva, 2010), have used a game-
theoretial approah, where the threshold rule was formulated. This rule denes
the value of auditing probability whih is ritial for the deision of taxpayers to
evade taxation or not. However, in real life, it is diult to implement tax inspe-
tions with the threshold probability beause this proess requires large investments
from the tax authority, while it has a substantially limited budget. Hene, the tax
authority needs to nd a way to stimulate the population to pay taxes in aor-
dane with their true level of inome. Previous studies (see Nekovee et al., 2007,
Tembine et al., 2010) have shown that information dissemination has a signiant
impat on the behavior of agents in various environments, suh as the urban pop-
ulation, the soial network, labor teams, et.
Taking into aount previous researh (Ainelli and Sanhez Carrera, 2012; An-
toi et al., 2014; Antunes et al., 2006; Apergis at al., 2010; Bardhan, 1997; Barro,
2000; Bloomquist, 2006; Kumaheva et al., 2018), this researh paper studies the
propagation of information about upoming tax inspetions as a tool to stimulate
the population to pay taxes honestly. This approah allows the tax authority to op-
timize the olletion of taxes within the strong limitation of the budget. In this re-
searh paper, we assume that the population of taxpayers is heterogeneous in its per-
eption of suh information. Additionally, to previous researh (Gubar et al., 2015;
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Gubar et al., 2017a) suseptibility of eah agent depends on its risk-status, due to
his\her natural propensity to risk. As in previous studies we take into aount three
possible risk-statuses: risk-loving, risk-averse and risk-neutral. These three statuses
dene the behavior of taxpayers, aording to their intentions to evade the tax pay-
ment. For example, risk-averse taxpayers prefer to avoid the punishment from the
tax authority, therefore, they pay taxes. Risk-loving taxpayers hoose risky behavior
and try to evade the tax payment. Risk-neutral taxpayers follow to exible and adap-
tive behavior, they an behave as a risk-loving or risk-averse taxpayers in dierent
onditions. The eonomi environment of eah individual also impats the pereiv-
ing of inoming information. However, in this researh study, we onsider taxpayers
that have risk-neutral status omposing a population of taxpayers. The risk-neutral
behavior model investigated in this paper is taken as the basis for studies of pop-
ulations with dierent risk statuses (Gubar et al., 2019; Kumaheva et al., 2019).
In ontrast to many dierent works, where information transmits during random
mathes of agents, we onsider only a strutured population and hene information
an be transferred only between onneted agents.
Soial onnetions of eah taxpayer mathematially an be desribed by using
network strutures and their modiations. Here we assume that tax authority in-
jets information about future audits to the population and thereby the initial share
of Informed agents is formed. Informed agents an spread information over their on-
tat network and thereby the ratio between informed and uninformed agents in a
strutured population is hanged. Propagation of information also initiates the mi-
gration of eonomi agents between two subgroups: those who pay taxes honestly
and those who evade payments. However in real-life situations, many agents ommu-
niate mostly with their family and friends, suh sorts of interations an be dened
by the network of ontats (see Tembine et al., 2010; Gubar et al., 2015). Aord-
ing to all these reasons we formulate an evolutionary model on the network on the
network whih desribes the variation of taxpayers' behavior. If a taxpayer swithes
on another status, then she transfers to the new subgroup, and thus the qualita-
tive struture of the population is hanged. This population proess resembles an
evolutionary game. Therefore, we an use the tools of evolutionary game theory,
suh as stohasti evolutionary dynamis, to desribe the hanges in the taxpayers'
behavior. A taxpayer, who reeives the opportunity to hange her status following
a revision protool, hooses an opponent at random and swithes from status i to
status j aording to the onditional rate (Sandholm, 2010; Gubar et al., 2017a;
Sanhez Carrera et al., 2018). In other words, the taxpayer an ompare his\her
behavior with the behavior of the random agent. If the exampled strategy gives
better payo, then she hanges her status (strategy). We estimate the initial and
nal distribution of taxpayers whih prefer to evade taxation in a series of numerial
simulations.
This paper is strutured as follows. Setion 2 develops a simple model showing
that if all itizens are taxpayers aording to inome distribution, but there is or-
rupt behavior from publi oials, then a group of poor itizens is the most aeted.
Setion 3 onsiders that itizens an evade paying taxes, and so being orrupt iti-
zens, then tax authority may onsider an auditing mehanism or tax ontrol whih
depends on both the tax rate and the penalty rate. Setion 4 develops the network
struture model for tax olletion, while setion 5 presents the numerial simulation
on suh networks strutures and its modiations. Setion 6 onludes the paper.
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2. Corrupt Oials and Taxpayers
There is a homogeneous population of n taxpayers, eah of them has an inome
yi, i = 1, n. Without lost of generality, onsider the two extreme inome groups, i.e.
the rih R and the poor P . The publi oials always perform ats of orruption
on these two populations, as they want a bribe or part of the inome of these
itizens. Assume that publi oials may overvaluate, ȳ > y or undervaluate y < y,
the inome of the itizens, where y > 0 denotes the true valuation. However, this
overvaluation or undervaluation depends on the true valuation. Let ȳ and y be given
by:
ȳ(y) = λy, ∀ λ > 1. (1)
y(y) = βy, ∀ 0 < β < 1. (2)
We assume that higher values of y reet more taxation on itizens. In ase the
publi oial, as an assessor, reports ȳ, the taxpayer has the right to approah a
ourt of law and appeal against the assessment. But there is a ost of doing so. The
osts of proving that the right valuation is y instead of ȳ is given by:
C(y) = α0 + α1y. (3)
C(y) ontains a xed part α0 whih suggests that no matter what the value of y
is, for example, one has to run-around and make a ertain number of trips to the
appellate authorities. Instead α1y says that depending on y, ertain fees need to be
paid to the legal expert ghting for the plainti. Even if some osts are reimbursed,
there is always a net ost.
Denition 1. Consider a proportional tax rate, τ > 0, on the true individual
inome, y, whih annot be misreported to the authorities (for instane formal
wages, publi and private salaries, shareholders, bank aounts, et.). An `honest'
system is when y(1− τ) is the individual net pay-o.
Note that in ase ȳ is reported, a itizen would go to the ourt i the following
holds,










τ(λ − 1)− α1
> 0. (4)
So, ∀ y > ȳ, the taxpayer will go to the ourt and its reservation pay-o would be
[y(1−τ)−(α0+α1y)]. Similarly ∀y ≤ ȳ, the taxpayer itizen will not go to the ourt
and its reservation pay-o would be (y− τλy). Notie that if someone is indierent
between the two, he hooses not to go to the ourt. As we mentioned there is perfet
information about individual inome by part of oial agents. Hene publi oials
know these reservation pay-os for these two groups of taxpayers, the rihest one,
R, and the poorest one, P . Let us dene these pay-os as
R ≡ [y(1− τ)− (α0 + α1y)], ∀y > ȳ
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and
P ≡ (y − τλy), ∀y ≤ ȳ.
The publi oial is orrupt and behaves in the following way. He/She would like
a bribe for announing y. But if the taxpayer insists on y instead, then the orrupt
oial intimidate him, and so ȳ will be assessed. Basially, the publi oial wants
a share of SR > 0 from itizen R and of SP > 0 from P as a bribe, where SR and
SP are dened by:
SR = y − τβy −R (5)
and,
SP = y − τβy − P. (6)
Let us assume that some bargaining power yields σSR and σSP to the publi oial,
0 < σ < 1, i.e. it is the bargaining power or how muh power orrupt oials have
to take over for appropriating some part of the wealth of the people.
Therefore, the net pay-o to R and P itizens are,
ΠR = y − τβy − σSR (7)
and,
ΠP = y − τβy − σSP . (8)
We are now in a position to ompare ΠR and ΠP with y(1− τ), the net pay-o in
a honest system (Denition 1). That is,
ΠR − y(1− τ) = τy(1− β)− σ[τy(1 − β) + (α0 + α1y)],
hene:
ΠR > y(1− τ) ⇐⇒ σ <
τy(1− β)
τy(1− β) + (α0 + α1y)
, (9)
and:
ΠP − y(1− τ) = τy(1 − β)− στy(λ − β)
hene:
ΠP > y(1− τ) ⇐⇒ σ <
1− β
λ− β . (10)
What (9) and (10) show, is to indiate how people with varying levels of inome (or
imputed inome), threatened by the orruption of oials under a bribery behavior,
ompare their position vis-a-vis the honest system versus the orrupt-system. Let
us state the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Rih and poor itizens prefer an honest system or a orrupt system
based on:





, everyone prefers the orrupt system to the honest system.







∃ y∗ > ỹ suh that people with y < y∗ prefer the
honest system to the orrupt state and people with y > y∗, prefer the orrupt
system to the honest system.






, everyone prefers the honest system.
Proof. Let us prove the above statement for eah item.
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, from ondition (10) it is obvious that ∀ y ≤ ỹ, orrupt system
will be preferred, sine ∀ y > ỹ, we get that:
τ(1 − β)




and then everyone will prefer the orrupt system.





(λ−β) < σ <
τ(1−β)
τ(1−β)+α1
exists y∗ suh that τ(1−β)τ(1−β)+α0/y+α1 = σ, where y
∗ > ỹ.
Hene for all y ≤ y∗ people will prefer the honest system, whereas for y > y∗,
people will prefer the orrupt system.
 Here, along with (9), (10) is reversed for all possible y. Therefore, everyone
prefers the honest system.
Thus it has been demonstrated.
Corollary 1. Thus the riher setion may prefer a orrupt system ompared to the
one where the publi oial behaves honestly.
Notie that, in the general ase with given α0 > 0, α1 > 0, people with very high
y, if orrupted by publi oials, will go to the ourt and gets y(1−τ)− (α0+α1y).
But he\she an share a surplus τy(1 − β) + (α0 + α1y) with orrupt oials. So,
unless σ is high enough, his\her net pay-o is greater than y(1 − τ) whih he\she
gets in the `honest' system. So he\she prefers the orrupt system. However, this
depends on the magnitude of α1 and σ. If α1 = 0, there is no σ < 1 for whih
everyone prefers the honest system. Moreover, for the same σ > (1−β)(λ−β) , ritial y
∗
will go down.
For riher people, the osts for orrupt behavior are relatively low and the aver-
age ost for faing orruption goes down with the level of inome as there is a xed
ost. Hene, the riher setion has a stronger bargaining power while sharing the
benet of underreported inome relative to those who are poor and fae relatively
high osts for faing orruption.
3. Corrupt Behavior of Taxpayers
Let us analyze the other side of the oin, that is when taxpayers heat in terms
of their true inome and thus try to evade taxes. As before, every itizen has a true
inome yi, but now he\she heats and delares an inome y∗i ≤ yi after eah tax
period. One again, the total set of taxpayers is divided into the groups of low-
level inome agents, the poor, and high-level inome agents, the rih. Note that the
number of partitions an be inreased, but it does not aet the following arguments
and onlusions.
For every taxpayer i, their inomes an take only two values: yi ∈ {P, R}, where
P is the poor itizen or low-level inome agent and R is the rih itizen or high-level
inome agent (0 ≤ P < R). Delared (false, heated) inome y∗i also an take values
from the mentioned binary set y∗i ∈ {P, R}. Thus, in this model there are three
dierent strategies y∗i (yi), whih depend on the relation between true and delared
inomes:
1. y∗i (yi) = P (P );
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2. y∗i (yi) = R(R);
3. y∗i (yi) = P (R).
Obviously that the taxpayers from the rst and the seond groups delare their
inome orrespondingly to its true level and they do not intend to evade. The third
group is the group of tax evaders.
Those rih itizens who delare themselves as poor, hene this group is of in-
terest to the tax authority. The tax authority audits those taxpayers, who delared
y∗i (yi) = P , with the probability TP ∈ [0, 1] in every tax period.
Let's suppose that tax audit is absolutely eetive, i. e. it reveals the existing
evasion. One the tax evasion is revealed, the evader must pay (τ +µ)(yi− y∗i ) > 0,
where positive onstants τ and µ are the tax and the penalty rates orrespondingly,
and (yi − y∗i ) is the hidden inome. For the agents from the studied groups the
payos are given by:
π (P (P )) = (1− τ)P ; (11)
π (R(R)) = (1− τ)R; (12)
π (P (R)) = R− τP − TP (τ + µ)(R− P ). (13)
The tax authority gets information about taxpayers' inomes from their tax de-
larations and audits those, who delared y∗i = P . The fration of audited taxpayers
is TP . It's obvious that either the agents from the rst group (who have true inome
yi = P ) or the evaders from the third group are both in this fration of audited
taxpayers.
The total set of the taxpayers is divided into the following groups: wealthy
taxpayers, who pay taxes honestly (y∗i (yi) = R(R)), insolvent taxpayers (y
∗
i (yi) =
P (P )) and wealthy evaders (y∗i (yi)) = P (R)).
Hene, the following arguments, related to the searhing of possible tax evasions,
apply to the third group of the agents, delared y∗i (yi) = P (R). The following
proposition is straightforward.
Proposition 2. If taxpayers are risk-neutral, then the optimal value of audit prob-
ability depends on taxes, τ , and inversely on the penalty rate, µ.
Proof. Risk-neutral taxpayers' behavior supposed to be rational, i.e. their tax
evasion is impossible only if the risk of punishment is so high that the tax evader's
prot is less or equal to his\her expeted post-audit payments (in the ase when his
evasion is revealed), then:
TP (τ + µ)(R − P ) ≥ τ(R − P ).
Therefore, the ritial value of audit probability TP (due to the taxpayer's deision





For this type of models the optimal solution is usually presented in the form of
the threshold rule in various modiations (see, for example, (Chander and Wilde,
1998) or (Vasin and Morozov, 2005)). In (Boure and Kumaheva, 2010) this rule is
formulated so that the optimal value T ∗P of the auditing probability is dened from
(14), and for the risk neutral taxpayer the optimal strategy is
y∗i (yi) =
{
R, TP ≥ T ∗P ;
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In our study we assume that people from risk-loving and risk-averse subgroups keep
their behavior despite of reeived information. It means that the value of olleted
taxes does not depend on these groups, whereas risk-neutral agents reat on the
reeived information and an hange their behavior. For example if a risk-neutral
agent reeives information that probability of tax audit is high then he\she pays
taxes honestly, else he\she evades.
We assume that information an be disseminated through soial networks. We
may onsider it as a stohasti alarm (see Sandholm, 2010), whih means the signal
to agent that he\she has an opportunity to reat to the hanges in the environment.
Nevertheless, some problems should be xed to make the stati model desribed
above lose to the real-life proess. The rst problem is that the players are supposed
to be risk-neutral. However, in real life, there are also risk-averse and risk-loving
eonomi agents. Another problem is that we onsider the game with omplete
information. It is assumed that the taxpayers know (or an estimate) the value of
the auditing probability, but in the urrent study, we do not take into aount the
method of reeiving information. Another problem is that the auditing with optimal
probability (11) is exessively expensive and the tax authority usually has a strongly
limited budget, thus the atual value of TP should be substantially less than T
∗
P
in real life. By taking into onsideration all mentioned reasons, in what follows,
we formulate an extended model of tax auditing whih inludes an information
omponent and an evolutionary proess of adaptation of the population of taxpayers
to hanges in the eonomi environment.
4. Evolutionary Games, Networks and Tax Colletion
In this setion, we introdue the formulation of an evolutionary model of infor-
mation spreading over the population of taxpayers. In a real-life situation, agents
who reeived information will share it with their losest neighbors, suh as family,
friends, and olleagues. Hene it is more natural to onsider a population with a net-
work struture in formalization of evolutionary game. The main dierene from the
lassial evolutionary game is that here agents transfer information, not to a random
opponent but they ommuniate only with onneted neighbors and friends. The
paper disusses three methods of seleting neighbors in the terms network topology.
The rst method a grid is used to dene the links between taxpayers. The seond
network struture is a strongly onneted network, and the third network struture
a weakly onneted network.
Let G = (N,L) denote an indiret network, where N = {1, . . . , n} is a set of
eonomi agent and L ⊂ N×N is an edge set. Eah edge in L represents two-player
symmetri game between onneted taxpayers. The taxpayers hoose strategies from
a binary set X = {to pay taxes, to evade taxes} and reeive payos aording to
a matrix of payo. Eah instant time moment agents use a single strategy against
all opponents and thus the games ours simultaneously. We denote the strategy
state by the vetor x(t) = (x1(t), . . . , xn(t))
T , xi(t) ∈ X (T is a transpose sign).
Here xi(t) ∈ X is a strategy of taxpayer i, i = 1, n, at time moment t. The detailed
denition of the games will be presented in subsetion 4.1. Aggregated payo of
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where axi(t),xj(t) is a omponent of payo matrix, Mi := {j ∈ L : {i, j} ∈ L} is a




for averaged payos. Vetor of payos of the total population is
π(t) = (π1(t), . . . , πn(t))
T .
The state of population will be hanged aording to the rule, whih is a funtion
of the strategies and payos of neighboring agents:
xi(t+ 1) = f({xj(t), πj(t) : j ∈Mi ∪ {i}}). (17)
Here we suppose that taxpayer hanges his\her behavior if at least one neighbor
has better payo. As the example of suh dynamis we an use the proportional
imitation rule (Sandholm, 2010), in whih eah agent hooses a neighbor randomly
and if this neighbor reeived a higher payo by using a dierent strategy, then
the agent will swith with a probability proportional to the payo dierene. The
proportional imitation rule an be presented as:








for eah agent i ∈ L where j ∈Mi is a uniformly randomly hosen neighbor, λ > 0
is an arbitrary rate onstant, and the notation [z]10 indiates max(0,min(1, z)).
4.1. An Instant Game
As in lassial evolutionary game theory, the instant ommuniations between
taxpayers is desribed by two players bimatrix game. We denote by A a matrix
for the rst player and the payo matrix for her opponent by B = AT . The next
modied payo matrix is adapted to the model of tax ontrol.
Remark 1. Corruption and evasion of taxation an be analyzed as baseline games,
i.e. i) prisoner's dilemma game, ii) stag hunt game, and iii) hawk-dove game.
Whereas total tax revenue depends on information regarding the tax ontrol system.
The urrent subsetion examines an instant game between a ouple of taxpayers
in a strutured population. As it was shown in (Sandholm, 2010; Weibull, 1995)
the instant interations between taxpayers an be dened by two-players symmet-
ri bimatrix game Γ (A,B). There are exist four lasses of two-players symmetri
bimatrix games, where eah lass is haraterized by the struture of the game, gen-
eral properties of strategies, and equilibrium proles. Below we present the three
types of suh bimatrix games in terms of tax-ontrol system and use their strutures
as a possible senario of the interation between two agents in the proess of the
dissemination of information.
Sine the struture of the strategies sets and payo funtions are the same
in this lass of games then the payo matrix for the rst player is denoted asA
and for the seond player, payo matrix is dened as B = AT . Aording to this
notation, in tables below strategies and payos of the rst player are represented to
simplify the visual presentation. In our study, we suppose that the payo matrix of
the instant game between onneted agents has the struture of one of the following
lassial games: the Prisoner's Dilemma, the Stag Hunt game, the Hawk-Dove game.
Sine the struture of these bimatrix games is well-known, they are appropriated to
evaluate the impat of network struture and imitation rules. Further, an instant
interation an be modeled by using the speial struture of the game.
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The Prisoner's Dilemma Firstly, we modify the Prisoner's Dilemma in terms
of tax-ontrol:
C D
C π + SW π − SW
D π(L(H)) π
where strategy C is to ooperate and an be interpreted as behavior to pay taxes.
Strategy D orresponds to behavior to defet in the lassial formulation, but in
our interpretation, it desribes behavior to evade. The seond player uses the same
strategy set {C,D}. Payo
π = 1/2π(P (P )) + 1/2π(R(R))
is an average prot of the mean agent, parameter SW > 0 denes soial welfare,
obtained for the partiipation in soial onsolidation, whih means that if taxpayers
pay taxes then he\she reeives some soial goods provided by the olleted taxes.
The Stag Hunt game. Sine this bimatrix game desribes a soial hoie
between personal and publi goods then we hoose it as an alternative instant game
between onneted taxpayers. Here payo matrix for the rst player is
S H
S π + SW 0
H π − SW π − SW
where we an interpret player's strategies in the following way: strategy S and H
orrespond to hunt and a hare in the lassial ase. The seond player uses the
same strategy set {S,H}. In our framework strategy, S denes honest behavior and
ditates taxpayers to pay taxes and strategy H ts to evasion respetively.
The Hawk-Dove game. As the third alternative of the instant game we
use the Hawk-Dove game, whih also desribes a onit between more and less








where strategy H orresponds to Hawk, behaves aggressively, in our framework it
denes the behavior to evade taxation. Strategy D orresponds to be a Dove, who
behaves passive, and in our formulation, this strategy dened the honest behavior
and player pays taxes. The seond player uses the same strategy set {H,D}. Here we
suppose that individual payos satisfy the inequality π(P (R)) << (τ + µ)(R− P ),
whih means that it is appropriate for the large values of parameters τ and µ, when
there is a big dierene (R − P ).
4.2. Total Tax Revenue
We use the next assumptions to desribe the aggregated system osts whih
our during the proess of information spreading over the population of taxpayers:
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 The onsidered population is restrited by the subpopulation of rih taxpayers
R with high level of inome, where nR is a number of agents in population;
 If there is no information irulates in the populations then the total population
evades hene nR = nev, where nev is the number of evaders);
 If information is injeted in the initial time moment by the tax authority then
we denote by n0inf = n
0
nev the number of informed taxpayers about inreased
probability of tax auditing and then they deided not to evade;
 In eah time moment we have nR = nev(t) + nnev(t) (or νnev(t) + νev(t) = 1),
t ∈ [0, T ], where T is the time of information injetion.
Based on these assumptions we an state the following orollary.
Corollary 2. There are two dierent types of models for tax ontrol. The rst
model does not inlude the proess of information dissemination. If the information
does not irulate in the population then risk-neutral taxpayers do not pay taxes.
Also if taxpayers suppose that the probability of auditing is rather small (Tp < T
∗
p ),
then they also evade and the only honest taxpayers are risk-averse agents.
Hene, we an ompute the total tax revenue in ase of the absene of informa-
tion, i.e.
TTR0 = nP τP + nR (τ P + TP (τ + µ)(R − P ))− nTP c. (19)
If we take into aount the dissemination of information in the population of tax-
payers then at the initial moment tax ontrol system injets information into the
population. Sine information starts to irulate in population then we have a
share of informed taxpayers ν0inf = νinf (t0). The ost of unit of information is
cinf (cinf << c). At the moment when the system reahed its steady state νinf
is the share of those who pereived information and paid taxes, νev is the share of
those who still evades. In this ase the total tax revenue is




ev (τP + TP (τ + µ)(R − P ))
)
−
−n(TP c+ ν0infcinf ),
(20)
where νTnev is the share of taxpayers who don't evade at the moment t = T , ν
T
ev
is the share of taxpayers who ontinue to evade taxation at the moment t = T ,
ν0inf is the value (fration) of the informational injetion at the initial time moment
(ν0inf = νinf (t0)).
In the following setion, we present a simulation analysis on dynami networks
to verify the aforementioned about the ontrol of tax olletion, onsidering: i) tax
and penalty rates, ii) probabilities and osts of auditing, iii) the information levels,
and so iv) looking at the network's dynamis of the share of tax evaders itizens.
5. Numerial Simulations
In this setion we represent the series of numerial experiments to illustrate
evolution of the behaviors in the population of taxpayers in the long-run period and
estimate the impat of information propagation on the desire of evasion. By using
the model of information spreading, we run experiments for dierent ases of the
network topology and instant games. All experiments inlude a grid, strongly and
weakly onneted random graphs.
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The evolutionary proess of spreading information in the population of taxpay-
ers is based on the instant bimatrix games suh as the Prisoner's Dilemma, Stag
Hunt, Hawk, and Dove games to dene the interonnetions between taxpayers.
The empirial data used in all experiments are based on the following values for
tax and penalty rates (see. tabl. 1) and the distribution of inomes over the total
population. The distribution of inomes has been taken from (The web-site of the
Russian Federation State Statistis Servie, 2018).
Table 1 ontains values of general parameters of the model. Subsetion 5.1. shows
the seleted experiments, whih reet the most interesting ases of the system evo-
lution, whih demonstrate the failities of the speially designed software. Multiple
running of the sript enables to assess the trends in the behavior of taxpayers and
an serve as a basis for further development of the deision-making system.
The results of the iterative proess of spreading information over the population
of taxpayers were visualized on a small network of 25 nodes (nR = 25), however, all
these results an be extended for a large number of nodes. Aording to the formula
of total tax revenue (19) we alulate total tax revenue, whih is TTR0 = 56855.81
rub in eah experiment. In all gures the idential notation is used to dene the
nodes in the networks: we mark the agents who use strategy to pay taxes as
yellow dots and the agents who use strategy to evade as the blue dots. Series
of numerial simulations have been split into several series of experiments subjet
to the network onguration. The results of dierent runs of speially developed
software are summarized in tables 3-6. In all tables the next notations are used:
PD orresponds to the Prisoners Dilemma game, HD orresponds to the Hawk-
Dove game, SH orresponds to the Stag Hunt game.
Table 1. General parameters for numerial simulations.
Parameter Value
tax rate τ = 13%
penalty rate µ = 13%
optimal value of the probability of audit T ∗P = 0.5
atual value of the probabilities of audit TP = 0.1
unit ost of auditing c = 7455 (rub.)
unit ost of information injetion cinf = 10%c = 745.5 (rub.)




(xi(t)− xi(t+ 1)) ≤ 10
−3
The distribution of the inome among the population of the Russian Federation
in 2018 (see Tab. 2).
5.1. Experiments
Series 1: Grid. This paragraph represents the results of numerial experiments
on the network of the grid and dierent strutures of bimatrix games. Table 3 ollets
some auxiliary information of the experiments: type of the instant game, initial and
nal states, et.
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P less 25000 P = 12500 43
R more 25000 R = 50000 57
Table 3. Results of Simulation for Grid
Num- Initial injetion Initial Payo Number of Final The value










1 15 (15, 10) PD 6 (0, 25) 24 071.12
2 11 (11, 14) SH 2 (11, 14) 49 306.94
3 4 (4, 21) HD 25 (25, 0) 87 592.56
In the urrent experiment, we an notie that if the interation between tax-
payers is dened by the Stag Hunt game, then the number of non-evaders and,
therefore, the total tax revenue is inreasing.
Figures 1  3 illustrate the evolution of the taxpayers preferenes during the
long-time period. In all experiments pairs of gures demonstrate the proportions of
evaders nev and non-evaders nnev taxpayers in population in the initial and nal
time moments.
Fig. 1. Initial state: (nnev , nev) = (15, 10); nal state: (nnev , nev) = (0, 25).
Series 2: Random Graph. The urrent series of numerial experiments rep-
resent results for the ase of the random graph. Table 4 ollets some auxiliary
information of the experiment.
This series of experiments demonstrates the eetiveness of the Hawk-Dove game
struture amongst the others. In this sheme, the number of non-evaders is inreas-
ing, and therefore we have TTRT > TTR0.
Fig. 4 illustrates the hanges in taxpayers' behavior in the initial and nal time
moments.
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Fig. 2. Initial state: (nnev, nev) = (11, 14); nal state: (nnev , nev) = (11, 14).
Fig. 3. Initial state: (nnev , nev) = (4, 21); nal state: (nnev , nev) = (25, 0).
Table 4. Results of Simulation for Random Graph
Num- Initial injetion Initial Payo Number of Final The value










1 4 (4, 21) HD 18 (25, 0) 87 592.56
Fig. 4. Initial state: (nnev , nev) = (4, 21); nal state: (nnev , nev) = (25, 0).
Series 3: Strongly Conneted Network. This paragraph represents the re-
sults of experiments obtained for the strongly onneted network. Tab. 5 ollets
additional information about numerial simulations.
In this ase, the Prisoner's Dilemma seems to be the most eetive in eonomi
meaning.
Figs. 5  7 illustrate the evolution of the taxpayers' behavior.
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Table 5. Results of Simulation for Strongly Conneted Network
Num- Initial injetion Initial Payo Number of Final The value










1 16 (16, 9) PD 8 (0, 25) 19 598.12
2 13 (13, 12) SH 7 (25, 0) 80 883.06
3 7 (7, 18) HD 11 (22, 3) 78 270.25
Fig. 5. Initial state: (nnev, nev) = (16, 9); nal state: (nnev , nev) = (0, 25).
Fig. 6. Initial state: (nnev , nev) = (13, 12); nal state: (nnev , nev) = (25, 0).
Fig. 7. Initial state: (nnev, nev) = (7, 18); nal state: (nnev , nev) = (22, 3).
Series 4: Weakly Conneted Network. The results of experiments for the
weakly onneted network are summarized and presented in the Tab. 6.
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Table 6. Results of Simulation for Weakly Conneted Network
Num- Initial injetion Initial Payo Number of Final The value










1 14 (14, 11) SH 4 (20, 5) 68 327.87
2 4 (4, 21) HD 6 (16, 9) 66 335.12
Fig. 8. Initial state: (nnev , nev) = (14, 11); nal state: (nnev , nev) = (20, 5).
Fig. 9. Initial state: (nnev , nev) = (4, 21); nal state: (nnev , nev) = (16, 9).
The main result of the experiments is that the information spreading is non-
eetive for the weakly onneted network in both game strutures: the Stag Hunt
and the Hawk-Dove games.
Figs. 8  9 illustrate evolution of the system under information spreading.
5.2. Numerial Simulations: the Main Trends and Disussion
The series of numerial experiments show that the nal distribution of taxpayers
between honest and evaders depends on some reasons. We reeive that network
struture and an instant game between onneted taxpayers strongly inuene the
nal state. In our simulation, we have that if we hoose the Prisoner's Dilemma as
an instant game then due to the properties of this game, evaders, whih strategy
orresponds to strategy D prevail. That means that the equilibrium is ahieved in
the ase when both interating agents hoose a strategy of tax evasion. If we use
the Stag Hunt game as a game between onneted taxpayers then we have several
subases:
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 If we alulate umulative and average payos with a uniform initial distribution
of strategies then in the steady-state the honest taxpayers prevail.
 However we reeive that both mixed equilibria are possible, as well as situations
where all taxpayers at the nal moment shy away or not evade taxes.
For the Hawk-Dove game as an instant game, we have that mixed equilibrium or
equilibrium of non-evaders prevail. There is a positive trend from the sal author-
ities' point of view: the inrease in the number of non-evading agents.
Additionally, it an be notied that the nal distribution of taxpayers in an
iterative proess of information spreading depends on the number of iterations,
the existene of isolated groups of taxpayers who are not involved in propagation
proess; the initial injetion of the information (the share of those who reeived
the information); lass of payo matrix whih inuene on the struture of Nash
equilibria.
As the main results of the series of numerial simulations we an see that the
propagation information about possible tax audits over the papulation of taxpayers
brings a positive eet for the total revenue of the sal system and inreases the
total amount of honest taxpayers. Knowledge of the struture of the payo matrix
simplies the behavioral analysis of the impat of information on the eetiveness
of tax ontrol.
6. Conluding Remarks
Corruption on the part of the bureauray appears or operates in several ways,
but above all in two diretions: diversion of resoures in non-existent rms; or in
work ontrats drafted and designed with the skill to eonomially favor one or
both parties, i.e. the agreement between the government and private initiative at
all levels. From this perspetive, publi expenditure, as an integral part of national
inome, is diverted and therefore only a small part of the population, in general, the
rihest is beneted, but above all, beause as a positive multiplier eet of the eon-
omy, its appliation distorted that impat, reduing aggregate inome and therefore
aggregate demand, the domesti market. In the absene of eieny in publi ad-
ministration, plus impunity between the parties involved in orruption, for the rih,
it is easier to resort to bribery or ollusion, both to redue proessing times and to
ondut business with guaranteed prot. Although orruption is an important fator
in the inequitable distribution of inome, as the model demonstrates, and therefore
a fator that an inuene the redued eonomi growth, although the streamlining
of proedures through bribery ould eventually boost business. However, inequality
is one of the most visible eets of orruption.
In this researh paper, we study the network's dynamis of agents with High
and Low levels of inome (Poor and Rih agents), where these two groups of agents
dier by their relation to orruption on a tax payment system. It is known that
audit of the whole population of taxpayers needs a large budget to ath taxpayers
who prefer to evade taxes and reah an optimal value of audited subpopulation.
However, usually, the tax authority has a limited budget and it is neessary to nd
additional methods to reah an optimal share of audited taxpayers.
Therefore, we have inluded the proess of information spreading into an evo-
lutionary model of tax ontrol on the network. The evolutionary model helps to
estimate the impat of information about a future tax audit, reeived from the
tax authority on the deisions of taxpayers. We also reformulate lassial bimatrix
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games in terms of the tax authority system to use them as instant games into the
evolutionary proess. Series of numerial simulations have shown that the nal dis-
tribution of taxpayers who pay taxes depends on the network struture and reeived
information. Hene propagation information about possible tax audits gives a pos-
itive eet on the total revenue of the sal system and inreases the total amount
of taxpayers who prefer to pay taxes honestly. The proess of hanges in taxpayers'
behavior over time is presented by the ompliated model we illustrate in numerial
experiments.
Tax authorities disseminate information that they intend to verify no less than
this proportion of the population. However, sine the budget is not always suh
as to provide suh an audit plan, this information, in partiular, may turn out to
be misinformation. But even in this ase, it is eonomially eient (inreases tax
olletion), whih we showed using our simulation modeling. All experiments were
made under the assumption of full rationality of agents, whih means that we take
into aount only risk-neutral agents, but in the future, it is possible to extend the
model with risk-loving and risk-averse agents.
The urrent researh shows that one of the most important aspets for restarting
the momentum of eonomi growth and the distribution of wealth for development,
among other strategies of eetive eonomi poliy, is to redue orruption and,
above all, to have eetive ontrol of the ability to ollet taxes to apply a poliy
for the redistribution of inome.
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